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I. Introduction
The standard Comprehensive General Liability (CGL)
policy of the 1970s and early 1980s provided coverage for all
bodily or property damage arising from an "occurrence."2
This type of policy also typically contained an exclusionary
clause known as the pollution exclusion clause. A pollution
exclusion clause is a disclaimer of coverage for damages re-
sulting from the "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of
pollutants.3 However, the pollution exclusion disclaimer is
nullified if such discharge of pollutants is "sudden and acci-
dental."4 In other words, a sudden and accidental occurrence
would be covered under a CGL policy.
The 1970s and early 1980s brought the enactment of fed-
eral environmental liability statutes such as the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA),5 the Clean Air Act (CAA),6 and the Clean
Water Act (CWA). 7 These federal statutes were accompanied
by a number of coordinating state statutes.8 These environ-
mental laws created new avenues for environmental liability
2. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162, 1165 (3d Cir. 1991).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
8. See John C. Yang, The Battle Continues: Decisions Concerning Pollution
Exclusions Remain in the Forefront, 9 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 119 (Spring 1997).
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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and thus, environmental litigation. Amidst this litigation
was the dispute interpreting the pollution exclusion clause of
the 1970s and early 1980s; the focus of the debate was the
definition of "sudden and accidental."9
Northville Industries Corp. v. National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. of Pittsburgh,10 decided on March 25, 1997, was the
New York Court of Appeals' first attempt to settle the dispute
and to define the meaning of "sudden" in standard CGL poli-
cies.1 ' The New York Court had defined "accidental" in prior
holdings and found it unnecessary to determine the meaning
of the term "sudden" in its decisions.12 In the Northville case,
the New York Court of Appeals found that it was time to ex-
pressly interpret and determine the meaning of the word
"sudden." In this case of first impression, the court reasoned
that the term "sudden" was unambiguous and defined it as
having a temporal aspect meaning "abrupt."13
Part II of this Case Note provides a general background
on the CGL insurance policy, the pollution exclusion clause
and the "sudden and accidental" exception. It also discusses
the history and the application of the clause in New York.
Part III presents the split of authority in various jurisdictions
regarding upholding the pollution exclusion clause and the
interpretation of the term "sudden" in the exception. Part IV
discusses the facts, procedural history, and the analysis of
the New York Court of Appeals in Northville. Part V contains
a critical analysis of the case, presents an analysis revealing
its inadequacies, and presents a proposal for future litigation.
Lastly, Part VI concludes that the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in interpreting the term "sudden" as having a temporal
aspect, provides little guidance for settling the divergent judi-
cial interpretations of the clause.
9. See id.
10. 636 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), affd, 679 N.E.2d 1044 (1997).
11. See Madelaine R. Berg, Court of Appeals Interprets 'Suddenness' Re-
quirement, 218 N.Y. L.J. 9 (1997).
12. See id.
13. See id.
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II. The Backgound of The Pollution Exclusion Clause
and "Sudden and Accidental"
A. General History: The Early Years
Conventional liability insurance is a form of indemnity
contract under which the insurer agrees to cover the insured
for up to the maximum amount of the policy, if the insured is
deemed liable to a third party for any injury covered by the
insured's policy. 14 Businesses will usually purchase a com-
prehensive general liability insurance policy 1 5 to cover liabili-
ties that arise in relation to the day to day functions of the
business and its property.16 CGL coverage requires that an
insurer both defend and indemnify the insured in any litiga-
tion and for any payment made as a result of or arising from
a loss.1 7 These policies are standardized and thus are attrac-
tive to insurance companies because they are theoretically
easy to interpret and efficient to use.' 8 However, with the
pollution exclusion clause, this is not the case.
The CGL policy in 1966 read:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
14. See ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY § 6, at 295-296 (1992).
15. "Standardized CGL policies are generally drafted by committees of in-
surance representatives sponsored by the Insurance Service Office (ISO) and its
predecessor organizations, the Insurance Rating Board (IRB) and the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU). The ISO is a trade association that
provides rating, statistical, actuarial and policy drafting services to about 3,000
insurers. Policy forms developed by the ISO are approved by its constituent
insurance carriers and then submitted to state agencies for review. In many
states... standardized ISO insurance forms cannot be marketed to consumers
until they obtain regulatory approval." New Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1180.
Once the provision is approved by the regulatory board, the details are final and
nonnegotiable by those covered by the CGL policy. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of America, 629 A.2d 831, 851 (N.J. 1993).
16. See PLATER, ET AL., supra note 14, at 295-96.
17. See Sharon M. Murphy, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to The
Pollution Exclusion Clause In Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Poli-
cies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 163
(1992).
18. See id. at 164.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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damages because of bodily injury or property damage
caused by accident.19
The "caused by accident" phrase was intended to limit insur-
ance liability by exempting coverage "where the insured in-
tentionally or recklessly caused injury to persons or damage
to property."20 However, a plethora of definitions for "acci-
dent" arose as courts interpreted the language of the policy. 21
Although a minority of courts defined "accident" as having a
sudden element, the majority of courts ignored a sudden re-
quirement and defined accidental as an unexpected and unin-
tentional event.22  Therefore, "[flaced with customers'
demands for greater coverage, the uncertainty of judicial in-
terpretations, and the general trend toward judicially ex-
panded coverage, the insurance industry universally
switched to an 'occurrence-based' coverage in 1966."23
The new CGL policy stated:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence.... 24
An "occurrence" was, and still is, defined as "an accident, in-
cluding continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
19. S. Hollis M. Greenlaw, The CGL Policy and The Pollution Exclusion
Clause: Using the Drafting History to Raise The Interpretation Out of The Quag-
mire, 23 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PxoBs. 233, 235 (1990) (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through
The Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1245 (1986).
22. See Scott D. Marrs, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Validity and Applica-
bility, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 662 (1991).
23. Rosenkranz, supra note 21, at 1246.
24. Greenlaw, supra note 19, at 238. "Insurance policy language is typi-
cally decided by an industry-wide organization rather than by individual insur-
ance companies. Thus, changes in policy language usually go into effect for all
insurance companies at about the same time.... In each specific case, the ac-
tual language of the particular insurance policy involved must be examined, not
the year of the policy." Robert E. Henke, Ohio's View of the Pollution Exclusion
Clause: Is there Still Ambiguity?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 983 n.1 (1989).
19991 289
5
290 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."25 The in-
surance industry intended to remove the suddenness require-
ment and to allow for coverage of gradual, unintended, and
unexpected events. 26 There was no intent, under the 1966
policies, to cover commercial clients who knowingly and de-
liberately committed polluting acts. 27 However, courts were
still divided in interpreting the 1966 policy language, with
many courts continuing to rule in favor of those who know-
ingly and intentionally polluted.28
After much uncertainty concerning the liability of the in-
surance industry under the CGL policy, in 1969 the insur-
ance industry attempted to clarify the issue by drafting the
pollution exclusion clause. 29 On March 17, 1970, the Insur-
ance Rating Board (IRB) adopted the clause. 30 In 1973, the
pollution exclusion clause became a standard part of CGL
policies. 31 A typical pollution exclusion clause found in all
CGL policies from 1970 to 1986 read:
[T]he insurance coverage does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land,
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental. 32
The pollution exclusion clause was drafted to clarify lia-
bility, yet differing theories developed regarding its meaning.
The most common question arising in the courts has been
whether the interpretation of the exclusion clause allows cov-
erage for liability resulting from gradual property damage, or
25. Marrs, supra note 22, at 663.
26. See id.
27. See Rosenkranz, supra note 21, at 1248.
28. See Marrs, supra note 22, at 663.
29. See generally Greenlaw, supra note 19, at 243-44.
30. See id. at 244.
31. See Robert E. Henke, Ohio's View of the Pollution Exclusion Clause: Is
There Still Ambiguity? 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 983 (1989).
32. Id.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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whether the "sudden and accidental" phrase restricts cover-
age to instances in which the damage is instantaneous or ab-
rupt.33 A number of courts have held that coverage is barred
only if the pollution is expected or intended, and that unin-
tentional and gradual discharges are covered. 34 However, a
larger number of courts have claimed that any gradual inten-
tional or unintentional pollution discharge is barred from
coverage. 35 A universal interpretation of the clause has yet
to be achieved.
B. New York's Pollution Exclusion Clause History and Its
Liability Coverage
In the early 1970s, New York insurance regulators ap-
proved the insurance industry organizations' submissions for
a pollution exclusion clause in CGL policies. 36 This approval
was based upon the understanding that coverage would be
barred for gradual pollution.37 In 1971, New York legislators
mandated that the pollution exclusion clause be included in
all liability policies.38 The law stated that insurance cover-
age was prohibited unless the discharge was "sudden and ac-
cidental."39 Governor Rockefeller, in 1971, stated that the
law's purpose was "[t]o prohibit commercial or industrial en-
terprises from buying insurance to protect themselves
against liabilities arising out of their pollution of the environ-
ment."40 The Governor also stated that forcing companies to
33. See 2 EUGENE R. ANDERSON, ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
275 (1997).
34. See id. at 305.
35. See id.
36. See Brief of Amicus Curiae by Insurance Environmental Litigation As-
sociation at 2, Northville Industries Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Company 679 N.E. 2d 1044 (N.Y. 1997) (No. 95-00905) [hereinafter IELA].
37. See id.
38. See id. at 3. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, has also
described its pollution exclusion history in the case, Technicon Electronics Corp.
v. American Home Assurance Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), afTd,
542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989). During the periods that Technicon acquired its
CGL policies, New York mandated that liability carriers include a "pollution
exclusion" clause the phrase "sudden and accidental." Id. at 102.
39. See id. at 8 (citing N.Y. Law § 765 (1971)).
40. Id. at 8 (quoting N.Y. Legis. Annual 353, 354 (1971)).
1999]
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bear full cost would encourage complete compliance with New
York's environmental laws. 41 Furthermore, the State of New
York, in issuing this bill, took a strict stand to protect the
environment and to prevent the discharge of noxious sub-
stances into the water and air.42 The Governor stated that
even though the laws were stringent, the polluter would be
protected from high fines and other environmental liabilities
if they were able to purchase a CGL policy with the pollution
exclusion clause.43
In 1982, the insurance companies successfully lobbied for
the repeal of the 1971 law and began to offer Environmental
Impairment Liability (EIL) policies specifically covering grad-
ual pollution in other markets.44 The New York State Legis-
lature then decided to enact a bill45 which allowed the
insurers to decide and negotiate the extent to which pollution
liability would be excluded. 46 Yet, the legislative history of
the 1982 bill47 reflected an understanding among the govern-
ment and insurance industry that the 1971 law precluded
coverage for gradual pollution.48 Additionally, the New York
41. See supra, note 36, IELA at 8-9.
42. See Technicon, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 102 (quoting the memorandum of Gov-
ernor Rockefeller).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See N.Y. Legis. Annual at 271 (1982).
46. See Technicon, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
47. See N.Y. Legis. Annual at 271 (1982).
48. See IELA, supra note 36, at 10. The amicus curiae brief relays the his-
tory of New York's legislative intent regarding the 1970s pollution exclusion
clause:
" The chairman, Senator John R. Dunne, "of the 1982 State Senate
committee on Conservation and Recreation who introduced the
bill, wrote that '[t]he purpose of this bill is to authorize the sale of
'gradual' or 'nonsudden' pollution liability insurance in New
York. In 1971, then Governor Rockefeller, signed a bill into law
that prevented the writing of gradual pollution liability insur-
ance .... At present, New York is alone in the country in its
restriction of permitting insurance to be issued to cover gradual
or non-sudden pollution.'" IELA, supra note 36, at 10 (quoting
memorandum of Senator John R. Dunne in N.Y. Legis. Annual at
271) (emphasis added).
" The Governor's Approval Memorandum also explained that the
1982 legislation "authorize [d] the writing of insurance policies to
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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State Legislature, which adopted the bill mandating the pol-
lution exclusion clause, seemed to have decided that "sudden"
meant abrupt or instantaneous. 49
The 1982 New York bill50 repealed the requirement that
the pollution exclusion clause be included in CGL policies. 51
Therefore, the liability carriers were not required to cover lia-
bility resulting from intentional, continuous discharges of
pollutants.5 2 Although the requirement was no longer pres-
ent after 1982, the State of New York did not abandon its
intent to protect the environment from intentional pol-
luters.53 Therefore, even though the pollution exclusion
clause was not mandatory, it was and still is upheld in the
New York courts.
III. Split in Authority in Interpreting the Pollution
Exclusion Clause
In recent years, there has been a dispute over the inter-
pretation and meaning of the pollution exclusion clause found
in the insurance policies of the 1970s and the 1980s. The in-
surers argue that the pollution exclusion clause has both a
temporal element as well as an element of unexpectedness. 54
Thus, the exclusion clause does not cover gradual pollution
claims but does cover "boom"-type accidents. 55 The insured
argue that the word "sudden" is unambiguous and means
cover liabilities arising from the gradual release or discharge of
pollution and contaminants." Id. at 10-11 (quoting Governor's
Approval Memorandum) (emphasis added).
* The State Department of Commerce wrote that it had "no objec-
tion to this bill which would amend the Insurance Law to repeal
the prohibition against the sale of 'gradual' or 'non-sudden' pollu-
tion liability insurance." 1982 N.Y. Laws, ch. 856 (Bill Jacket)
(Memorandum of John J. Kelliher to John G. McGoldrick of July
28, 1982) (emphasis added) quoted in Brief of Amicus Curiae by
IELA supra note 36, at 11.
49. See IELA, supra note 36, at 11.
50. N.Y. Legis. Annual at 271 (1982).
51. See Technicon, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 102-103.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 103.
54. See Yang, supra note 8, at 119.
55. See id.
19991 293
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only "unexpected. '56 As a result, policyholders maintain that
coverage exists as long as the policyholder did not "expect or
intend" the pollution-related injury. 57 Some courts have fol-
lowed the insurers' interpretation, while other courts have
ruled in favor of the policyholders' interpretation of the
clause. 58 Case law from various jurisdictions, including New
York, illustrates this split.
A. Upholding the Pollution Exclusion Clause - "Sudden"
Means Abrupt
In 1996 and 1997, a number of states' highest courts up-
held the pollution exclusion clause as unambiguous with re-
spect to the definition of the phrase "sudden and
accidental." 59 These courts have also defined "sudden" as
having a temporal aspect meaning abrupt.60 This issue has
been litigated for a number of years prior to the most recent
wave of litigation.61
Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage
Tank Fund Board v. Farmland Mutual Insurance Co.62 is one
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See infra Part III A-B.
59. See Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund
Board v. Farmland Mutual Ins. Co., 568 N.W. 2d 815 (Iowa 1997); Northville
Indus. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 679 N.E.2d 1044 (N.Y.
1997); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 1059 (Del.
1997); North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Mai, 939 P.2d 570 (Idaho 1997); Highlands Ins.
Co. v. Aerovox Inc., 676 N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1997); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997); Drexel Chemical Co. v.
Bituminous Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1996); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Repub-
lic Ins. Co. et al., 929 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1996).
60. See id.
61. The following cases have also upheld the pollution exclusion clause and/
or defined sudden as having a temporal aspect meaning abrupt. See, e.g., Dim-
mitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla.
1993); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty v. Belleville, 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
1990); Upjohn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Shell
Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815 (Cal. 1993); Ogden
Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991); Auto Owners Ins. Co.
v. City of Clare, 521 N.W.2d 480 (Mich. 1994); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal
Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1989); Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989).
62. 568 N.W. 2d 815 (Iowa 1997).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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of the most recent cases which has determined that the pollu-
tion exclusion clause is unambiguous and that "sudden"
means abrupt. 63 In Iowa Comprehensive, as in the Northville
case, the issue was whether "sudden" was to be interpreted as
requiring that the pollution occur abruptly, as a "boom
event," or whether it required an unforeseen or unexpected
dispersal. 64 Iowa Comprehensive involved a gasoline storage
tank leakage that allegedly occurred over a ten year period
prior to the tank removal in 1988.65 The Farmland Mutual
Insurance Company's CGL policy contained a pollution exclu-
sion clause. 66 Based upon this clause, Farmland Mutual
claimed that insurance coverage was barred.
In its analysis, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed previ-
ous court decisions on the principles for the construction and
interpretation of insurance policies. 67 In interpreting the
term "sudden," the court noted that even the dictionary had
more than one definition; one having a temporal aspect and
the other focusing on whether the event was unexpected or
unforeseen.68 The Iowa court recognized and rejected the
Wisconsin court's interpretation of "sudden" in Just v. Land
Reclamation Ltd.,69 which stated that "[t]he very fact that
recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition of
'sudden' is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambigu-
ous."70 Instead, the Iowa Supreme Court relied on New Cas-
tle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,71 and
adopted the view that "the existence of more than one diction-
ary definition is not the sine qua non of ambiguity. If it were,
few words would be unambiguous." 72 Moreover, the court re-
63. See Insurance: Pollution Exclusion Clause Unambiguous; 'Sudden'
Means Abrupt, High Court Finds, DAILY ENVTL. REP., Sept. 22, 1997, at A-1.
64. See Iowa Comprehensive, 568 N.W.2d at 816.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at *3.
68. See id.
69. 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
70. Id. at 573, cited in Iowa Petroleum, 568 N.W.2d at 818.
71. 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1193. The New Castle court found, however, under this test, that
the term "sudden" was ambiguous according to Delaware law. See infra Part
III B(2).
1999] 295
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iterated that the term "accidental" had been defined as an
"unexpected" and "unintended" event. 73 Therefore, since "ac-
cidental" was already defined as "unexpected" and "unin-
tended," to interpret the term "sudden" as having the same
meaning would render it redundant and useless.74 Thus, the
court held there was no ambiguity in the term "sudden" and
that the term had a "temporal aspect requiring an abrupt
event."75
Ohio's case history is illustrative of the differing views
regarding the pollution exclusion clause and the recent trend
of defining "sudden" as having a temporal aspect.7 6 In 1984,
in Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents and
Chemical Co. ,77 the court found that the clause was ambigu-
ous and defined "sudden" as not having a temporal aspect. 78
Although the Buckeye decision was cited with approval by
various other state courts, the Ohio courts, in more recent de-
cisions, have taken a different view.7 9 Two cases, Borden,
Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co. 80 and Hybud Equipment
Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance,8 ' are recent examples of the
Ohio courts' rejection of the Buckeye court's analysis. These
courts found that the terms were unambiguous, 2 with "sud-
den" having a temporal aspect and meaning "happening
quickly, abruptly or without prior notice."8 3 Whereas "acci-
dental means unexpected as well as unintended."8 4 Lastly,
the Hybud court held that the pollution exclusion clause cov-
ered only those damages caused by an abrupt release, not
gradual and abrupt releases.8 5
73. See Iowa Petroleum, 568 N.W.2d at 818.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 816.
76. See Hencke, supra note 31, at 983.
77. 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
78. See id. at 1233.
79. See generally Buckeye Union Insurance Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227.
80. 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989).
81. 597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992).
82. See Hencke, supra note 31, at 995.
83. Hybud, 597 N.E.2d at 1101.
84. Id. at 1102.
85. See id. at 1103.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/2
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B. Pollution Exclusion Clause is Ambiguous
1. State Court Holdings
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.8 6 and
Claussen v. Etna Casualty & Surety Co.87 both held that the
term "sudden" is capable of more than one meaning and is
therefore ambiguous.88 Claussen looked at the construction
of the contract and upheld Georgia law that "words in a con-
tract generally bear their usual and common meaning."8 9
Yet, also according to Georgia law, if there is doubt as to the
interpretation of the words, then the meaning most strongly
adverse to the writers of the policy, the insurers, is pre-
ferred. 90 The court recognized that a common meaning for
"sudden" is the word "abrupt," but also noted:
[I]t is, indeed, difficult to think of "sudden" without a tem-
poral connotation: a sudden flash, a sudden burst of
speed.... But, on reflection one realizes that, even in its
popular usage, "sudden" does not usually describe the du-
ration of an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden
storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death.91
Therefore, since sudden has more than one meaning, the
court found the phrase ambiguous, construed it in favor of the
insured, and applied the "unexpected" meaning.92
In Hecla Mining Co., a CERCLA complaint was filed af-
ter the removal of timber and debris caused a discharge of
sedimentary sludge which contaminated the water and
turned the Arkansas River orange. 93 The CGL policy at issue
86. 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d 1200 (Or. 1996); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992); American
States Ins. Co. v. Kiger 662 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. 1996); Joy Technologies, Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992); Greenville County v. Ins.
Reserve Fund, 443 S.E.2d 552 (S.C. 1994).
87. 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
88. See generally supra, notes 81 and 82.
89. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 687-88.
90. See id. at 688.
91. Id. at 688.
92. See id. at 689.
93. See Hecla Mining Co., 811 P.2d at 1085.
1999] 297
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in the case included a pollution exclusion clause. It also pro-
vided defense and liability coverage for damage that resulted
from unexpected and unintended occurrences, but not for
damages caused by the discharge of pollution unless it was
"sudden and accidental." 94 Hecla argued that the phrase
"sudden and accidental" was ambiguous since Hecla's CGL
insurance policies did not define the meaning of the phrase. 95
Therefore, Hecla concluded, the language must be construed
in favor of the insured to mean unexpected and unintended
and against the insurers who drafted the policy.96
The court in Hecla looked at the definitions of "sudden"
in a number of dictionaries, including Webster's Third New
International Dictionary,9 7 Random House Dictionary,98 and
Black's Law Dictionary. 99 It found that "sudden" had a vari-
ety of meanings and could reasonably be defined to mean "ab-
rupt," but could also reasonably be defined to mean
"unexpected."100 The court noted that in the portion of the
CGL policies which define occurrence:
[A]ccident is defined to include "continuous or repeated ex-
posure to conditions, which result in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage, neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured." If "sudden" were to be given a
temporal connotation of abrupt or immediate, then the
phrase "sudden and accidental discharge" would mean: an
abrupt or immediate, and continuous or repeated dis-
94. See id. at 1087.
95. See id. at 1088, 1090.
96. See id. at 1090.
97. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2284 (1986) (defin-
ing "sudden" as "happening without previous notice... occurring unexpectedly
... not foreseen").
98. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1900 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "sudden"
as "happening, coming, made, or done quickly").
99. See Hecla Mining Co., 811 P.2d at 1091. The court noted that BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (5th ed. 1979) defined sudden as "[hiappening without
previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; un-
foreseen; unprepared for."
100. See Hecla Mining Co., 811 P.2d at 1091.
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charge. The phrase "sudden and accidental" thus becomes
inherently contradictory and meaningless. 10 1
Therefore, finding that the term sudden could have a number
of meanings, one being "unexpected," the court held the
clause to be ambiguous and found in favor of the insured. 10 2
2. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company:' 03 The Significance of
Multiple Dictionary Definitions
In New Castle, decided after the Claussen and Hecla de-
cisions, the Court of Appeals noted that the district court
found considerable significance in the dictionary meaning of
the term "sudden." 0 4 Relying on Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary, defining "sudden" as "happening without
previous notice" or "occurring unexpectedly," 05 the plaintiffs
argued that there are also other definitions with connotations
of brevity and thus the word has more than just one reason-
able definition. 0 6 Therefore, the term is ambiguous and
should be interpreted in favor of the insured. 0 7
However, the court recognized the problem of relying
solely on dictionaries to determine whether or not a word is
ambiguous. "Although dictionaries are helpful insofar as
they set forth the ordinary, usual meaning of words, they are
imperfect yardsticks of ambiguity. By their very nature, dic-
tionaries define words in the abstract. .".."108 The court noted
that any person could have looked up the word "sudden" in
the dictionary and discovered that there were several defini-
tions of the word, and thus have rationally concluded that
there was more than one reasonable definition. 09 This
101. City of Northglenn v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D.
Colo. 1986), quoted in Hecla Mining Co., 811 P.2d at 1092.
102. See generally Hecla Mining Co., 811 P.2d 1083.
103. 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1991).
104. See id. at 1193.
105. See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2284
(1971)).
106. See New Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1193.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1193-94.
109. See id. at 1194.
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would, therefore, cause the word "sudden," as used in insur-
ance policies, to be ambiguous. 110
The court in New Castle found this to be a reasonable
approach, but also reiterated the "basic principle of insurance
law that all words in a policy should be given effect.""'
The very use of the words "sudden and accidental" re-
veal[s] a clear intent to define the words differently, stat-
ing two separate requirements. Reading "sudden" in its
context, i.e. joined by the word "and" to the word "acci-
dent," the inescapable conclusion is that "sudden," even if
including the concept of unexpectedness, also adds an ad-
ditional element because "unexpectedness" is already ex-
pressed by "accident." This additional element is the
temporal meaning of sudden, i.e. abruptness or brevity. To
define sudden as meaning only unexpected or unintended,
and therefore as a mere restatement of accidental, would
render the suddenness requirement mere surplusage. 112
Under this basic principle, the New Castle court further rea-
soned that even if the word "sudden" was defined as "unex-
pected," this would not make it completely synonymous with
the word "accidental." 1 3 The court recognized that as a stan-
dard practice, the insurance policies used words that were sy-
nonymous but not absolutely repetitive and redundant." 4 In
conclusion, the court determined that adding the word "sud-
den" to the word "accidental" with the word "and" does not
necessarily create a temporal element meaning "brevity" or
"abruptness."" 5 Therefore, the term "sudden" was ambigu-
ous under Delaware law, for it could have more than one
meaning, including "unexpected." 1
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 557
A.2d 393, 402 (1989), quoted in New Castle County, 933 F.2d. at 1194.
113. See New Castle, 933 F.2d at 1194.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1194-95.
116. See id. at 1198.
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C. Missouri's Anti-Redundancy Canon
The D.C. Circuit Court, in Charter Oil Company v. Amer-
ican Employers' Ins.,117 applied an "anti-redundancy canon"
in determining the meaning of the word "sudden" within the
pollution exclusion clause.11 Pursuant to this "anti-redun-
dancy canon" and Missouri law, "all words in an insurance
contract [must] be given meaning" 119 and the term "sudden"
must be "defined to eliminate [any] redundancy."120 The
court found that the anti-redundancy canon would be vio-
lated if "sudden" was defined as meaning "unexpected" be-
cause the term "accidental" was already defined and accepted
as having that exact meaning.121 Both words would have the
same meaning. 122 Therefore, to avoid such redundancy, the
term "sudden" must mean abrupt.1 23
Furthermore, the court in Charter Oil Co. distinguished
this case from other cases by holding that "sudden" meant
"unexpected."124 Specifically, the court distinguished itself
from Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 125 The court
recognized that, "a sudden bend in the road is still 'sudden'
for a driver on a familiar road, that a 'sudden' storm is not
really sudden, but also abrupt, and that a 'sudden' death usu-
ally does not describe a lingering death, but one that happens
abruptly in time."126 Therefore "sudden," in having a tempo-
ral aspect, could only mean "abrupt."127
117. 69 F.3d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Charter Oil involved the wrongful dispo-
sal of hazardous waste, a mixture of dioxin and waste oil, used as a dust sup-
pressant spray at various Missouri sites, resulting in ground contamination.
See id.
118. See id. at 1163.
119. Kevin Murphy, Hurry Up and Have an Accident: Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Contract Standard Pollution Exclusion Clause Includes a Tempo-
ral Element, Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Insurance, 3 Mo. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 222, 227 (1996).
120. Id.
121. Charter Oil, 69 F.3d at 1164.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1165.
125. 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989). See supra Part III B.
126. Kevin Murphy, supra note 119, at 228.
127. Charter Oil, 69 F.3d at 1165-66.
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D. New Jersey's Interpretation of the Clause
In Morton International Inc. v. General Accident Insur-
ance Co. of America,128 the New Jersey Supreme Court recog-
nized that "sudden" had a temporal aspect in the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause.129
However, the court did not stop at defining and applying the
term "sudden" to the facts of the case, but also considered the
regulatory history of the pollution exclusion clause in its
holding. 130 The court found that the insurance industry had
made it clear that no damages resulting from expected and
intended pollution would be covered, but that the industry
had not represented that they intended to exclude any other
types of polluting acts such as gradual pollution.' 3 ' More-
over, the court recognized that the insurance industry, by ex-
cluding acts other than expected and intended ones, was
creating a reduction in coverage.132 The court found the reg-
ulators' representations not only misleading, but also decep-
tive.' 33 In general, a number of other states, including West
Virginia, Kansas, and the territory of Puerto Rico, found that
the IRB and the Mutual Insurance Rating Board 34 never at-
tempted to explain or disclose the full impact and operation of
the clause as a reduction in coverage that had previously
been provided. 135 In view of the false representations alleg-
edly found in the regulatory history, the court construed the
pollution exclusion clause broadly to permit coverage even
where the discharge was gradual and did not occur
abruptly.136
The court applied regulatory estoppel by virtue of the
fact that the insurance industry had represented, to New
Jersey's regulatory agencies, that the pollution exclusion
128. 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994).
129. See generally id.
130. See Morton Int'l Inc., 629 A.2d at 848.
131. See id. at 870.
132. See id. at 852-53.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 868. The Mutual Insurance Rating Board is an insurance
industry trade association. Id.
135. See Morton Int'l Inc., 629 A.2d at 853-54.
136. See id. at 872-73.
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clause was merely intended to clarify the. scope of coverage
for pollution damages and would not significantly limit the
coverage already available. 137 After determining that "sud-
den" may have more than one meaning, whether it had a tem-
poral aspect meaning "abrupt" or whether it meant
"unexpected," the court found the issue of the "sudden" defini-
tion less important in understanding the pollution exclusion
clause. 138 Instead, the court found the focus of the analysis to
be on:
whether the courts of this state should give effect to the
literal meaning of an exclusionary clause that materially
and dramatically reduces the coverage previously available
for property damage caused by pollution, under circum-
stances in which the approval of the exclusionary clause by
state regulatory authorities was induced by the insurance
industry's representation that the clause merely "clarified"
the scope of prior coverage. 139
In further analyzing the Morton Int'l Inc. case, the court
recognized that, in a non-regulatory context, if there are any
false representations concerning the coverage of or the exclu-
sions from an insurance policy which result in a detriment to
the insured, such as a reduction in previously provided cover-
age, then the insurer is estopped from denying coverage.
140
The Morton court expanded this non-regulatory estoppel doc-
trine to be used in a regulatory context.' 41 The court stated
that the "basic role of the Commissioner of Insurance is 'to
protect the interests of policy holders' and to assure that in-
137. Permacel v. American Insurance Company and Insurance Company of
North America, 691 A.2d 383, 386 (N.J. 1997) (discussing Morton Int'l Inc. 629
A.2d at 874). The Superior Court of New Jersey relied on the Morton case in its
holding, but also notes that New York, along with Connecticut and Maryland,
have not extended the definition of "sudden" beyond the temporal element it
ordinarily connotes.
138. See Morton Int'l, Inc., 629 A.2d at 872.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 873.
141. See id. at 874.
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surance companies provide reasonable, equitable and fair
treatment to the insuring public." 142
The New Jersey court also found that there were misrep-
resentations made by the IRB in order to gain approval by
the state insurance regulatory authority. Therefore, the
court concluded that an equitable and reasonable solution
would be to bind the insurance industry by the representa-
tions presented at the time of state approval. 143 In conclu-
sion, the court stated that the pollution exclusion clause
would have automatically been enforced had the IRB simply
informed the state insurance regulatory authority of the cov-
erage to be provided.144 This would have lessened the
amount of litigation surrounding the issue. 45
The court further stated that the insurance industry
failed to disclose the insurance effect on the policy for the in-
sureds. In doing so, the court found they had knowingly
given false information regarding the effect on the policy to
the state Department of Insurance at the clause's submission
for approval. 46 Therefore, the court held that because the
industry profited from their "nondisclosure by maintaining
pre-existing rates for substantially-reduced coverage,"147 the
just judgment was to require the industry to bear the burden
and provide the coverage it had represented at the time of the
clause's approval. 148
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Alabama
Plating Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co.,' 49 found the repre-
sentations made by the insurance industry, to gain state in-
surance agency approval, misleading. 50 The court also found
that the term "sudden" was ambiguous and that the policies
142. Id. (citations omitted).
143. See Morton Int'l, Inc., 629 A.2d at 874.
144. See id. at 876.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See Morton Int'l, Inc., 629 A.2d at 874.
149. 690 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1997).
150. See Thomas R. Head, Insurers Suffer Defeat in Environmental Claims:
Alabama Rejects Pro-Insurer Interpretation of Pollution Exclusion Clause, 20
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 673 (1997).
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covered gradual discharges of pollution.151 To determine the
regulatory representations of the insurance industry regula-
tors, the court looked at evidence of the drafters' intent.152
Upon examination, the court found that when the clause
was created and added to the "occurrence" based CGL poli-
cies, the intent was not to reduce coverage, but merely to clar-
ify that the policies did not cover intentional acts by
polluters.15 3 The court relied on statements by insurance
representatives and letters sent to state insurance depart-
ments.154 These statements included one submitted by the
Travelers Indemnity Company, which stated that only ex-
pected or intended pollution would be precluded from cover-
age.' 55 In a letter to the insurance commissioner, Richard
Reeves of the Travelers' Government Affairs Division stated
that The Travelers believed that the results of the two exclu-
sions, "occurrence" based and "sudden and accidental," were
the same. Reeves further stated that the new wording was
clearer in meaning than the previous "occurrence" based
clause. 56 Another example, a contemporary issue of The
Fire, Casualty & Surety Bulletin, 157 which is published by
the insurance industry to assist insurance agents and bro-
kers, stated that:
In one important respect, the [pollution] exclusion simply
reinforces the definition of occurrence. That is, the policy
states that it will not cover claims where the "damage was
expected or intended" by the insured and the exclusion
states, in effect that the policy will cover incidents which
are sudden and accidental - unexpected and not
intended.158
151. See id.
152. See Alabama Plating Co., 690 So. 2d at 335.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Alabama Plating Co., 690 So. 2d at 335, n.5.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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Therefore, based upon this evidence, the Alabama court
found that the insurers were estopped from denying coverage
to the insured.
E. Conspiracy Theory
As a result of the Morton decision, a different view has
arisen regarding the interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause. This view is that the insurance regulators conspired
to fraudulently misrepresent their intentions of coverage and
the meanings of the terms within the clause to the insured.159
According to this theory, the "sudden and accidental" term
had always been boilerplate language used in machinery poli-
cies since the 1950s. It has been repeatedly construed to de-
fine unexpected and not instantaneous occurrences. 160 Since
the boilerplate meaning of "sudden and accidental" had al-
ready been litigated, and uniformly interpreted as meaning
"unexpected and unintended," by the time the term was in-
cluded in the CGL pollution exclusion clauses, it was only ra-
tional to believe that the insurance industry intended the
same meaning for the 1970 clause. 161
In 1970, the industry submitted a standard-form memo-
randum explaining to state insurance commissioners that the
pollution exclusion was "intended to be merely a clarification
of the 'occurrence' definition and, therefore, that pollution in-
surance coverage was to be denied only in cases of intentional
pollution."162 This, however, was not the case. Instead, cov-
erage has not only been denied to intentional polluters, but
also to the unintentional polluter who relied on the expressed
intent of the insurance industry only to find that the coverage
they thought they were paying for over the years was in fact
reduced.163
159. See generally John G. Nevius and Steven J. Dolmanish, The Pollution-
Exclusion Conspiracy: A Newly Recognized Basis for Recovery, 13 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 1103 (1996).
160. See id. at 1111.
161. See id. at 1112.
162. Id. at 1114.
163. See Nevius, supra note 159.
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The insurance industry drafters of the clause deny there
was a conspiracy to reduce coverage. 164 However, the indus-
try had the opportunity to inform the state insurance com-
missioners of the intended restriction on "occurrence"
coverage. 165 They did not do this but instead reiterated that
it "merely clarified 'existing coverage as defined and limited
by the definition of the term 'occurrence. '" 166 In fact, the
term "clarification" "was intentional and meant to inform the
regulators that the exclusion was not a further restriction in
coverage."1 67 Therefore, courts, as in Morton and Alabama
Plating,168 agree that misrepresentations had occurred re-
gardless of whether there was in fact a conspiracy. These
courts have concluded that the industry should be estopped
from denying coverage to the insured when the drafters of the
clause falsely state the coverage of the pollution exclusion
clause. 169
IV. The Case: Northville Industries Corporation v.
National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, PA170
A. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Northville Industries Corporation owns and op-
erates two facilities on Long Island where it stores, distrib-
utes, and sells gasoline and other petroleum products in
terminals. 71 The facilities are located in Holtsville and East
Setauket, New York.17 2 The terminals have storage tanks
and "extensive networks of above-ground and underground
pipelines and pumps"1 73 which carry the gasoline and other
liquid petroleum products.
164. See Nevius, supra note 159.
165. See Nevius, supra note 159, at 1117.
166. Nevius, supra note 159, at 1117.
167. Nevius, supra note 159, at 1118.
168. See supra Part III D.
169. See Nevius, supra note 159.
170. 636 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), afftd 679 N.E.2d 1044 (1997).
171. See id. at 361.
172. See id.
173. Id.
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Defendants, National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, PA, along with a number of other defendant in-
surers174 provided primary and excess CGL policies to North-
ville Industries. All of the policies contained a pollution
exclusion clause and a "sudden and accidental" exception to
the clause. The policies stated that coverage was barred:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases,
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollu-
tants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental.17 5
In October, 1986, in compliance with the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) licens-
ing requirements, plaintiff installed monitoring wells at its
facilities. 176 While doing so they discovered that gasoline had
leaked from the pipes beneath the Holtsville terminal.177 En-
vironmental engineers determined that approximately
750,000 gallons of gasoline had leaked through an improperly
installed elbow and malfunctioning check valves in the un-
derground piping.178 The gasoline at the Holtsville facility
had been seeping into the groundwater and neighboring
properties possibly since the pipe's installation in 1976.179
Leakage and groundwater contamination on neighboring
property was also discovered at the East Setauket site when,
in November, 1987, plaintiff was complying with DEC licens-
ing requirements.180 At this site, "the source of the contami-
174. National Union Fire Insurance Co. and Hartford Accidental & Indem-
nity Company provided primary comprehensive general liability insurance poli-
cies. Continental Insurance Company and Pacific Insurance Company provided
excess general liability policies. See Northville, 679 N.E.2d at 1046.
175. Northville Indus. Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (emphasis added).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Northville Indus. Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
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nation was traced to a small 'pinhole' leak which was caused
by internal corrosion in a pipe." 181 The pipe was reportedly
installed in 1968, and an estimated 1.2 million gallons of pe-
troleum products and gasoline had been released through the
small hole.' 8 2 An official for Northville reported that at the
East Setauket site "the loss 'occurred slowly enough and over
a sufficiently long period of time to be undetectable by North-
ville's inventory control system.' ' 183
The neighboring property owners brought several suits
against Northville Industries. 84 The defendant insurers re-
fused to defend and/or indemnify Northville Industries,
claiming coverage was barred pursuant to the pollution ex-
clusion clause in each defendant's respective policy.' 8 5 In re-
sponse, Northville Industries commenced an action for
declaratory judgment regarding the insurers' duties to defend
and indemnify it.186 The insurers cross-moved for summary
judgment and to dismiss the complaint as it pertained to
them. 8 7
The Supreme Court of Suffolk County held that a ques-
tion of fact existed as to whether the gasoline leakage oc-
curred suddenly' 88 and granted the insurers' cross motions,
but only for claims concerning the East Setauket site.' 8 9 The
court found that the "sudden and accidental" exception did
not apply to the East Setauket site because the leak was due
to corrosion of the pipe.190 Corrosion is a "gradual natural
process occurring over a long period of time.' 9 '
The cross motions regarding the Holtsville contamina-
tion were denied. 92 Regarding the Holtsville site, the court
181. Id. at 362.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See Northville Indus. Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Northville Indus. Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
191. Id.
192. See id.
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found a genuine issue of fact as to whether the leak was "sud-
den."193 The supreme court granted Northville Industries'
motion and the insurers, National Union and Hartford, were
required to pay all costs for investigation and defense regard-
ing the two site claims and to defend Northville.19 4
The appellate division modified and affirmed the Suffolk
County Supreme Court's holding.1 95 It held that there was
no obligation to defend or indemnify Northville with respect
to either site's contamination. 96 The court stated that
Northville had the burden of proving that the "sudden and
accidental" exclusion applied. 197 According to the appellate
division, Northville failed to sustain its burden of raising a
genuine issue as to the applicability of the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause. 198 More-
over, the court held that: 1) the definition of the term
"sudden" included a temporal element, 99 and 2) Northville
was precluded from raising the regulatory estoppel issue. 200
The New York Court of Appeals granted plaintiff leave to ap-
peal and affirmed the appellate division's holding.20
B. The New York Court of Appeals Holding and Analysis
The court of appeals, in affirming the lower court's hold-
ing, also affirmed the lower court's decision that the term
"sudden" in the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pol-
lution exclusion clause has a temporal element.202 Thus, the
court rejected the insured's argument that the term "sudden"
was ambiguous. 203
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Northville Indus. Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
196. See id. at 362.
197. See id. at 363.
198. See id. at 369.
199. See id. at 359.
200. See Northville Indus. Co. 636 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
201. See Northville Ind. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 679
N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (N.Y. 1997).
202. See generally id.
203. See id.
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The court in its analysis relied upon two prior Court of
Appeals cases involving the pollution exclusion clause and
the "sudden and accidental" exception. Out of the two cases,
the court mainly relied upon the 1989 case, Technicon Elec-
tronics Corp. v. American Home Assuance. Co.204 In
Technicon, the court of appeals held that the sudden and acci-
dental discharge exception did not apply because the occur-
rence was not accidental. 20 5 The court defined "accidental" as
having a separate meaning from "sudden" based upon the
juxtaposition of the words. 20 6 Thus, both must be established
in order to qualify for the exception to the pollution exclusion
clause.20 7 Furthermore, the court held that "accidental" ex-
cludes from coverage "liability based on all intentional dis-
charges of waste whether consequential damages were
intended or unintended."20 8
The Technicon court found that, since Technicon alleged
a knowing discharge, there was no accidental discharge. 20 9
In Northville, unlike in Technicon, there were no allegations,
nor was there any evidence that the discharges were not un-
intentional or unknown.210 Therefore, the Northville court
and both parties agreed that the discharges were acciden-
tal.211 However, still at issue was whether the releases of the
petroleum into the groundwater and neighboring property
were "sudden."212
204. 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989). The other New York Court of Appeals
case concerning the pollution exclusion clause and the sudden and accidental
exception was Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y.
1989) (determining that "accidental" has a separate meaning from "sudden").
205. See Technicon, 542 N.E.2d at 1049. The Technicon case involved inten-
tional discharges of waste materials from Technicon Electronic Corp.'s plant
into waterways over a course of many years. See Technicon, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
The pollution exclusion clause in the Technicon case was similar to the one in
Northville Indus. Co. case. Compare generally Technicon, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 94
and Northville, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
206. See Technicon, 542 N.E.2d at 1050.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 1050.
209. See id. at 1050.
210. See Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1047.
211. See id.
212. See id.
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The Northville court rejected the plaintiffs arguments
that the term "sudden is ambiguous, which under familiar in-
surance law doctrine requires resolution of this issue against
the insurers and in favor of plaintiff insured, construing the
sudden and accidental discharge exception to apply."
213
Northville, relying on the Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dic-
tionary,2 14 argued that the one common definition of sudden
is "happening . . .unexpectedly." 21 5 Northville did concede
"that the meaning of sudden may also have a temporal ele-
ment manifesting abruptness . . . [or] brought about in a
short time,"216 but continued to argue either that the defini-
tion of sudden as "unexpected" governed or that the word was
ambiguous. 21 7 However, this theory was rejected because the
court, adhering to Technicon, held that the two words have
separate meanings and both terms must be met before the
exception to the pollution exclusion clause may be
triggered. 218
Not only did the court of appeals reject Northville's argu-
ment regarding the definition of "sudden" and the ambiguity
of the clause, but it also set forth the definition and interpre-
tation of "sudden."219 The court held that the word was un-
ambiguous, and that "sudden" had a temporal aspect causing
it to mean abruptly, precipitantly, or brought about in a short
amount of time.220 The court's definition avoided the redun-
dancy brought about by accidental meaning "unexpected."221
In determining whether the temporal aspect of "sudden"
was met for the purposes of nullifying the pollution exclusion
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See Northville Indus. Co. 679 N.E.2d at 1047.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See generally Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d 1044.
220. See id. at 1048. The Northville court also noted the observance of other
courts that: "[wie cannot reasonably call 'sudden' a process that occurs slowly
and incrementally over a relatively long time, no matter how unexpected or
unintended the process . . .nor wrench the words 'sudden and accidental' to
mean 'gradual and accidental,' which must be done in order to provide coverage
in this case." Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048 (citations omitted).
221. See Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048.
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clause, the focus was "on the initial release of the pollutant,
not on the length of time the discharge remains undiscovered,
nor the length of time that damage to the environment con-
tinued as a result of the discharge, nor on the timespan of the
eventual dispersal of the discharged pollutant in the environ-
ment."222 Yet, the court also held that more was required
than merely showing that the release of pollutants began ab-
ruptly.223 The temporal aspect of a "sudden discharge
[would] only be met by the discharge, abruptly or within a
short timespan, of a significant quantity of the pollutant suffi-
cient to have some potentially damaging environmental ef-
fect."224 When a discharge is unintended and unexpected, the
"sudden and accidental" exception is satisfied.225
In conclusion, once the insurer set forth reasons for deny-
ing coverage due to the pollution exclusion clause, the in-
sured then had the burden of showing that the discharge was
"sudden and accidental" so as to nullify the clause. 226 North-
ville failed to sustain its burden of showing that the exception
to the pollution exclusion clause applied. 227 Furthermore,
the discharges occurred continuously over a period of many
years, not abruptly.228 This was confirmed by affidavits
presented by plaintiff stating that the source of the East
Setauket contamination was the corrosion-based "pinhole"
and that the Holtsville release of petroleum was caused by a
failed underground elbow joint installed in 1976.229 There-
fore, the court found that the contamination of the two sites
222. Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048. (citing Hartford Acc. & In-
dem. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992); A. Johnson &
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 933 F.2d 66,72 (1st Cir. 1991); Lumber-
mens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass.
1990)).
223. See Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id. The court reiterated other courts' views that this shift "provides
the insured with an incentive to strive for early detection that it is releasing
pollutants into the environment." Id. at 1049 (citing Borg-Warner Corp. v. In-
surance Co., 174 A.D.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)).
227. See Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1049.
228. See id.
229. See id.
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did not occur suddenly.230 Thus, the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion clause did not apply.231
The court affirmed the appellate court's decision that insur-
ers were not obligated to defend or indemnify Northville In-
dustries Corporation.232
V. Critical Analysis
A. Inadequacies of the Holding
The New York Court of Appeals was correct in determin-
ing that Northville did not meet its burden of showing that
the discharge was "sudden and accidental" so as to nullify the
pollution exclusion clause in its CGL insurance policy. In
this case of first impression, concerning the definition and
coverage of the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion, the
court did not fully explain its holding and thus, the definition
of "sudden" has not been settled.
In 1997, the highest state courts in five states held that
the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous and that
"sudden" had a temporal element meaning abrupt.233 During
1997, "no state high courts have reached a different conclu-
sion."234 This seems to indicate that New York simply fol-
lowed the majority trend and did not attempt to fully analyze
the meaning of "sudden and accidental."
This Note argues that although the term "sudden" should
have a temporal aspect, meaning "abrupt," to avoid redun-
dancy and surplusage in the clause, the Northville case does
not sufficiently analyze the dispute to have a meaningful ef-
fect on future litigation. Unlike a number of other state court
decisions on this issue, the New York court did not review the
case in depth. In Iowa Petroleum, Borden Inc., Hybud Equip-
ment Corp., New Castle County, and most especially, the Mor-
ton case, the courts provided a full analysis regarding the
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See Iowa: Pollution Exclusion Clause Unambigous; 'Sudden' Means Ab-
rupt, High Court Finds, State Environment Daily (BNA) (Sept. 22, 1997).
234. Id.
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clear meaning of the word "sudden." The courts also ad-
dressed the redundancy issue in the term "sudden and acci-
dental" in their holdings. The Missouri court in Charter Oil
Co. v. American Employers' Ins. at least utilized state insur-
ance and contract law to arrive at the holding of the case.235
The Northville court did not engage in similar analysis and
therefore did not provide guidance for subsequent litigation.
Instead, it addressed this highly litigated issue briefly, as if it
did not want to go through the trouble of a full analysis. A
full analysis would have given guidance, and saved time and
money in future litigation. Understanding that the case was
one of first impression, as well as a case involving an un-
resolved dispute among the states, the court should have set
a clearer standard in determining the definition of the word
"sudden."
Additionally, the lack of guidance provided by the court
"leaves open the possibility that a different case could result
in a substantially different conclusion."236 Thus the holding
goes against the very purpose of the clause: limiting environ-
mental liability. First, the Northville case leaves open the
possibility of a different conclusion because the New York
Court of Appeals provides little guidance as to the degree of
"suddenness" that the clause requires.237 The meaning of
sudden has been found, in New York and in the majority of
the states, to mean "abrupt," "quick," or "occurring over a
short period of time." Yet, what is the necessary time period
for an event to be deemed "sudden?"
The Northville court does give some guidance in its hold-
ing by stating that the focus would be on:
[Tihe initial release of the pollutant, not on the length of
time the discharge remains undiscovered, nor the length of
time that damage to the environment continued as a result
235. See generally Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d
1160 (D.D.C. 1995).
236. Berg, supra note 11, at 9.
237. See id.
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of the discharge, nor on the timespan of the eventual dis-
persal of the discharged pollutant in the environment.
238
In the Northville case, however, it seemed easy for the
court to find that the initial release of the discharge of petro-
leum was not "sudden" and that Northville failed in its bur-
den of proof because the initial releases at the two sites came
from the corrosion of one pipe and the "pinhole" size hole in
another pipe. Furthermore, although the court held that
time was not to be the focus of the analysis for finding
whether the discharge was "sudden." The fact that the dis-
charges occurred undetected over a period of ten years was a
factor used to imply that the leakage was not sudden. This
vague analysis will result in much future litigation to deter-
mine what length of time constitutes a "sudden" discharge.
The court also focused on the corrosion and the "pinhole"
size leak which gave every indication that the discharge was
slow and gradual at the initial release as required by the
Northville holding.239 Yet, by this holding it seems that the
case would either be won or lost depending upon the size of
the hole or the reason for the discharge. The initial release
could occur in a variety of ways and thus courts will have to
determine each specific according to the facts. Courts would
just compare the measurements of the hole sizes or the types
of corrosion. The Northville case becomes useless in provid-
ing a precedent for future litigation and just becomes one
case amidst the many litigating this issue.
Secondly, this case has been embraced by the insurance
industry as creating an end to future responsibility of insur-
ance companies in New York when dispersals and discharges
are discovered many years after their initial release. 240 How-
ever, there will still be significant litigation in lower courts to
determine what the court meant when it stated that "a dis-
charge could be considered sudden if it occurred for a 'short
timespan' and involved a 'significant quantity of pollutants
238. Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048. See also supra Part 1V.B.
239. See generally Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1048.
240. See Alan J. Pierce, 1996 - 97 Survey of New York Law, 48 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 723, 728 (1998).
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sufficient to have potentially damaging environmental ef-
fect.'"241 Thus, the purpose of the clause, to limit environ-
mental litigation, has not been achieved and has only created
the potential for further law suits.
The Northville case also leaves open the possibility of a
different conclusion regarding the theory of regulatory estop-
pel, as seen in the Morton case. In Morton, New Jersey's
highest court found that regardless of "sudden" having a
temporal aspect meaning "abrupt," the court's focus should be
based upon a regulatory estoppel theory. New York has not
decided any case thus far on the regulatory estoppel theory,
but it has defined what "sudden" means. The Court of Ap-
peals in Northville dismissed the contentions of amicus cu-
riae242 that the insurers should be "estopped from denying
coverage because the insurance industry allegedly previously
made false and misleading representations to regulatory offi-
cials in New York and elsewhere regarding the true meaning
of the phrase "sudden and accidental." 243 The court stated
that Northville never advanced this theory at trial when it
had ample time to do so. Yet, the court does not give any
indication as to whether it would have entertained, reviewed,
or analyzed such a contention if it was properly brought
before the court. Although it would have been dicta, the court
should have taken this opportunity to clarify its stance on the
issue.
The amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the insurers stated
that the regulatory history of New York's approval of the pol-
lution exclusion clause indicates that there were no misrepre-
sentations regarding whether there would be coverage for
gradual discharges.244 The amicus curiae briefs stated that
Governor Rockefeller's memorandum and the legislative
hearings concerning the enactment of the bill mandating the
addition of the pollution exclusion clause supported the hold-
ing that gradual dispersals were to be excluded. However,
241. Id. (citing Northville Indus. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1049).
242. See IELA at 12.
243. Insurance Law 'Sudden and Accidental' Discharge Clause, 215 N.Y. L.J.
4 (1996).
244. See supra Part II.B.
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the amicus curiae briefs and the legislative hearings are
meaningless since they were not adopted by the court for use
as precedent in future litigation. Furthermore, various cases
in other jurisdictions have held that misrepresentations oc-
curred, 245 but the Northville court did not recognize this.
Therefore, since the term "sudden" was being defined by the
court for the first time, after it had defined "accidental" in
prior cases, 246 the court had the obligation to provide insight
into this issue to save time and money in future litigation
when the regulatory estoppel theory may be properly
presented to the court.
Had the court taken a stand on the issue of regulatory
estoppel, the New York position on the pollution exclusion
clause would have been clear. The court took the stand that
"sudden" had a temporal aspect meaning "abrupt." A number
of other courts have found that "sudden" meant "unexpected."
Under this regulatory estoppel theory, it does not matter
which states upheld which definition until the regulatory in-
tent is determined. In New York, it seems to be easier than
in other states because the pollution exclusion addition was
mandated by law. Through legislative hearing records of
New York, one can find the legislative intent regarding the
meaning and interpretation of the clause. This court, like the
court in Technicon Electronics, should have analyzed this in-
tent in determining the meaning of the term "sudden" for the
first time in the New York Court of Appeals.
B. Sudden Proposal
Should another case come before the New York Court of
Appeals to determine the pollution exclusion clause, New
York should follow the lead of its sister state, New Jersey,
and a number of other states, and determine that the mean-
ing of the terms "sudden" and "accidental" are not alone suffi-
cient, but should look to the representations presented to the
245. See supra Morton Part III.D.
246. See, e.g., Ogden Corporation v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39, 42 (2d
Cir. 1991); Nallan v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 366 N.E.2d 874, 875 (N.Y.
1977); Arthur A. Johnson Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of North America, 164 N.E.2d
704 (N.Y. 1959).
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New York Commissioner and determine whether the indus-
try should be estopped from reducing or denying coverage to
the insured. Only then can the question of the ambiguity and
the split of authority concerning the clause be resolved.
By determining the representations made by the insur-
ance industry and the legislative intent when the 1982 Bill
was mandated, then the coverage allowed to unintentional
polluters can be defined. Coverage for intentional polluters
has been and always will be denied. Therefore, the basic con-
cepts of preventing pollution dispersals and preventing fur-
ther litigation are still the primary purpose of the clause.
Lastly, by taking on the regulatory estoppel theory, the
question of what is "sudden" in the pollution exclusion clause
need not be litigated further.
VI. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals in Northville correctly determined
that Northville failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the
discharge was "sudden and accidental" so as to nullify the
pollution exclusion clause in its CGL insurance policy. How-
ever, in this case of first impression determining the defini-
tion and coverage of the term "sudden" in the pollution
exclusion clause, the court's guidance was insufficient as it
did not fully explain its holding. Based upon the facts of this
case alone, it was easy for the court to decide that the dis-
charge was not sudden. Furthermore, the regulatory estop-
pel theory should have been discussed by this court to limit
further environmental litigation on this issue. Lastly, future
litigation should determine coverage by adopting the estoppel
theory.
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